Wayne F. Kirsner, P.E.
Principal / Kirsner Consulting Engineering
ASHRAE Distinguished Lecturer:
June 2001 through June 2009
For Attorney for Engineering Firm being sued for their design of a steam distribution line of which 500 feet fell off its supports after a plant upset, defended engineering firm in a forensic report by demonstrating that an alternate computer stress analysis program gave the same results as the program they used to predict pipe movement during expansion, and the installing contractor did not site the pipe supports as directed on the engineering drawings. Therefore the engineer's pipe expansion program which showed the pipe design "would work" was not actually a model of what the contractor actually built. The Contractor's variance from design was aggravated by the division of contract administration between the Engineer and the Owner. the Engineer did not have field inspection responsibility. This case, which began in February 2015, settled after my report submission in May 2017.
For Newcrest Lihir Mining located on Papua New Guinea, April 2017: Investigated waterhammer incident in the steam piping coming from one of three Autoclaves during warm-up of the Autoclave when cold water was introduced to an isolation loop for instrumentation. The incident startled the Operator but did not rupture any piping component. The incident motivated Operations to invite me to site to investigate the accident and do two 8-hour waterhammer seminars for Supervisors, Engineers, and operators. I left a power point slide presentation for management explaining their incident along with another potential incident found during a plant walk-thru.
April 3, 2017, For attorney representing insurance company, submitted Expert Report on cause of 13 March 2013 Steam Hose Rupture on a tire press at a major tire manufacter's plant in which a maintenace contractor's technician received 2nd and 3rd degree burns. The essence of the technician's complaint was that a live steam hose carrying 250 psi steam spontaneously ruptured when he came into its general vicinity after climbing to the top of the press. The Plaintiff claimed that the steam hoses --some 24 per machine-- were worn out and failing. Maintenance records of unscheduled maintenance at the tire press did not support the Plaintiff's contention. Evidence uncovered during depositions plus the burn pattern on the man's body cast doubt on the technician's story that he was no where near touching, kicking or entangling distance of the steam hose that he had to step over to get to the item to which he was heading. My suspicions were initially aroused by the description he gave of the steam cloud he says he witnessed at the time of the break. It did not comport with research I'd done on steam jets released into atmospheric conditions.
For attorneys for York University, Toronto, Canada, investigated failures of anchors securing slip-type expansion joints to vault ceilings in 1800 feet steam pipe installed in 2003. Of six slip-type expansion joints in three steam vaults, anchors on all six joints failed within two years of service. My Report identified the two systemic reasons for the failures based on a review of the engineering drawings and the products installed by the Contractor; namely: 1) Pipe was not designed to expand strictly axially into the slip-type expansion joints; and 2) Substitution of spider-type pipe alignment guides for the more robust "combination guides and supports" designed by the Engineer. The substitution deprived the piping system of proper support in accordance with the joint manufacturer's specifications based on the B31.1 Code unless the spider guides were considered pipe supports. But spider type guides are not designed to serve as pipe supports. Using them as such put the weight of 1200 pounds of steel pipe (and sometimes up to 1200 pounds more of water during system warm-up) on the spider of each guide causing it to bottom-out and scrape along the guide housing in order to move during pipe thermal expansion. This weight vastly increased friction to pipe movement compared to the graphite-lubricated "guides and supports" which were originally intended by the Engineer. This case is ongoing.
For ConocoPhillips, Surmont 2 in the Wood Buffalo Region of Alberta, CA, beginning in Feb 2014 thru 2016 worked with Commissioning and Start-up Team to engineer the potential for waterhammer out of their many kilometers long steam distribution system. The effort resulted in re-engineering several sites where water hammer could occur. An example is shown in the slide at right made to explain the problem at TJ's Corner where the north side of the steam distribution system could be isolated from the south side. Should the steam Valves ever be closed to the north section of the site (while the south side stayed active), condensate could build up upstream of the isolation valves as depicted so that when the valves were reopened, condensation induced waterhammer could occur in the horizontal portion of the line. The section of line along with two others identified were re-engineered prior to start-up of the system.
In July of 2015 spent 7 days on site during start-up of the Surmount 2 steam system troubleshooting waterhammer concerns primarily in OTSG Blowdown piping, The system at Surmont was unique because rather than blowdown dumping to a pond at atmospheric pressure, the blowdown was piped to pressurized tanks. Troubleshot the reasons why waterhammer was occurring during start-up of the new Plant and suggested alternative designs, instrumentation, and operating procedures to prevent waterhammer. Months later in July 2016, was asked to review and comment on Risk Evaluation Report which I found to have incorrectly estimated the possible waterhammer forces that the blowdown piping might experience. After submitting my report 27 July 2016, was ask to provide waterhammer worst-case overpressure values and pulse duration times to the Risk Evaluation Firm. Completed 24 August 2016 but more detail was requested by ConocoPhillips Engineers. On 18 Sep 2016, submitted Power point presentation of scenarios w/ descriptions chosen (by me) for which the worst case waterhammer intensities were calculated and assumptions and calculations included. Conoco- Phillips responded with a request to examine and calculate waterhammer overpressure and pulse duration for waterhammer scenarios that they had selected for evaluation and input to the risk analysis performed by others.
Analysis of Steam Rupture of 24" Externally Pressurized Expansion Joint at Veolia-St. Louis Ashley Street Plant on October 9, 2014. The internal bellows of the expansion joint is protruding out of it's casing at right after the joints weld was ruptured by water hammer. On the morning of October 9th, 2014 while the Ashley Street Steam Plant was providing about 65,000 #/hr of 150 psig steam to the downtown area of St. Louis, a 24" expansion joint ruptured allowing steam to escape from M.H. 300-the first Steam Vault outside the Plant thru which the East 24" steam Main was trapped and anchored. The 24" East Steam Main-one of two Mains that leave the Plant-- was valved-off in the Plant at the time but pressurized nevertheless to 150 psi due to backflow from an open 16" interconnecting pipe to the other Steam Main leaving the Plant-the 20" West Header.
I investigated the possible causes of the rupture, concluded it was Condensation Induced Waterhammer after working out the waterhammer scenario and eliminating the other possible causes for the Accident. Reported the cause to Veolia in a slide presentation and Report.
Design Review of Prototype Well Pad Module for Cenovus Energy, Calgary, April 2015.
The purpose of the Review was to point out locations where condensate could accumulate and lead to slugging or Condensation Induced Water Hammer and then suggest design modifications or operational procedures to avoid these possibilities. The design modifications focused on configuration which avoided the need for provision of steam traps.
For Cenovus Foster Creek SAGD Site in Alberta, CA, investigated root causes of support damage in 14" steam lines in the South OTSG Steam Plant due to waterhammer initiated by overflow of boiler feedwater from a steam separator into the steam lines after a plant trip. This was an example of Condensation Induced Waterhammer due to cold water dumping into a hot steam line instead of steam inserting itself into a condensate filled line.
For Veolia Energy Corporation, troubleshot expansion joint failures in condensate return system which was mixing 100oF condensate return from a turbine hot well with the discharge of high pressure steam traps in the condensate return line. Five externally pressurized bellows joints failed in five separate instances. Diagrammed out reasons for condensation induced waterhammer occurring in the lines, pointed out design flaws, and recommended changes to eliminate or mitigate waterhammer.
For ConocoPhillips Woods River Refinery, consulted on possibility of waterhammer in new superheated 600 psig steam lines to processes and advisability of providing traps at low points in superheated steam lines. Briefed manager and refinery consulting engineer on possibility of accidents I could foresee during start-up and shut down of sections of the superheated line. Later retained as a consultant to an attorney to advise on the cause of a steam release accident at the ConocoPhillips Borger Refinery in Texas that is the subject of a law suit. This waterhammer accident occurred in a superheated steam line that operators assumed could not collect condensate if under operation. An unusual and unexpected operating configuration triggered the Accident.
For Attorneys representing the University of New Hampshire, investigated and submitted Expert Report on cause of steam release accident due to a water hammer in a new 10" steam line being started up by one of the construction contractor's subcontractor employees. The waterhammer in the 60 psi steam line blew out a gasket at an 8" closed valve that permitted water and steam to escape and fill the 11' 8" deep Vault containing the valve. One worker was badly burned. Neither he nor his helper could remember what they did in the Vault on the day of the Accident, or the day before. In my 10,000 word report, I laid out the scenarios that could have led to, and triggered, the Accident. The drawing at right shows the Vault flooded with condensate 2 days before the accident due to a ruptured check valve in the trap discharge piping. The August 2012 magazine article "Waterhammer in Condensate Return Systems" is about the rupture of the check valve.
For Suncor Oil Sands in Ft. McMurray, Alberta, analyzed causes of chronic waterhammer in two-phase condensate return piping system conveying condensate discharge from 790 psi heat exchangers mixed with pumped 287oF condensate back to Flash Tank set to recover 50 psi steam. The study reported on the multiple causes of the waterhammer, predicted under what conditions hydraulic transients would occur, and recommended a piping reconfiguration solution. A variation of this solution developed by Suncor engineers is being implemented. The analysis and solution are based on experimental data developed by Creare in the late 1970"s to address LOCA events in Nuclear Reactors.
For the Comanche Unit III Power Station-- an 850 MW, supercritical, coal fired power plant in Pueblo, CO., troubleshot two hydraulic transient problems --one in the 16" return pipe emptying into the Plant Deareator, and another in the 16" Boiler Drains Tank pipe to the 3 psia Condenser Hot Well. While the transients were not severe enough to rupture the XS pipe or put operators in danger, they were forceful enough to knock pipe slips off supports (see example below at right) and cause damage to valves and structure that had to be repaired.
After doing two seminars for Plant operators, I explained what was happening to the Principle Plant Engineer, why it was happening and, in the case of the Deareator piping, recommended a simple fix which is being implemented. For the Boiler Drains Tank emptying to the vacuum in the hot well, the damage pattern indicated the Tank was draining below the level of it's outlet pipe thereby permitting flashing steam to enter the discharge line. If the water in the horizontal pipe had stood idle and cooled during a plant shut down, the entering steam could cause condensation-induced waterhammer that would match the damage pattern. A leaking level control valve in the Line to the Condenser Hot Well was the most likely cause of the tank draining far below it's controlled level.
For Attorneys defending Hydronics Systems Manufacturer, Engineer, and Architect, investigated steam release at Las Vegas hotel where a technician was severely burned while attempting to start up a new steam-to-hot water-heat exchange assembly. During start-up, 110 psig steam was admitted to a steam line which was already filled with subcooled condensate because the Assembly's steam trap and condensate mover had not been activated during a start-up attempt a month earlier by the same contractor. The condensation-induced waterhammer resulting from the mixing of the 344oF steam with 70oF water blew out a flange gasket spraying the worker with hot water and steam. He died a week later in the Hospital. My November 2010 Report on the cause of the accident led to the immediate settlement of the law suit brought by the family of the worker against the manufacturer, vendor, hotel, engineer and architect
For Minara Mining at the Murin Murin Nickel Mining Site in Western Australia, investigated 3250 kPa (465 psi) steam rupture in a 10" schedule 80 pipe feeding slurry to an Autoclave. Submitted Report explaining the cause of the steam release to Minara and Safety Directorate. Assisted in writing and editing Mine Safety Bulletin No. 92 for Government of Western Australia Department of Mines and Petroleum. Dr. Fred Moody worked with me on a ground breaking portion of this investigation to calculate the pipe thrust of the escaping slurry which caused the ruptured pipe to whip around like an unrestrained fire hose. June- Sep 2010.
Forensic engineer assisting plaintiffs attorney to understand the 2004 steam explosion outside the New Executive Office Building in Washington D.C. which killed two contractors attempting to re-energize steam service to the NEOB after a water main break. Water from the break submerged the steam main serving the building causing increased condensation in the Main and subsequent water hammer in the building. The Contractors received an emergency request to shut the steam feed off in the street. In the morning, when the contractors were attempting to restore steam service to the building , the water hammer repeated in the manhole outside the building where the contractors were opening the valve. The force of the waterhammer blew off the bottom plate of a jury-rigged pipe cap for the drip leg welded in place years ago by an amateur welder. The steam and hot water released from the steam main killed two contractors at the manhole.
For Suncor Energy, Firebag, Canada--Analyzed water hammer in the common Blowdown Header from OTSG's where flashing steam from superheated water and is mixed with subcooled water. (The diagram at right shows six scenarios for how subcooled water flowing into a steam line can either be stable or cause condensation induced waterhammer). Provided report analyzing all foreseeable water hammer susceptibilities in steam plant producing 11,000 kPa steam for SAGD bitumen recovery at the Firebag site in Northern Alberta. Presented 7 hour seminar at Firebag to Operations Managers and Engineers explaining condensation-induced waterhammer and the origin of waterhammer suffered at their Plant. Advised Suncor's engineers on developing equipment modifications and operating procedures to avoid waterhammer scenarios. Diagram at left is from Aya, Yayame, Nariai's "Effect .. Waterhammer Induced by Injection of Subcooled Water...into Steam flow. " It served as my model for diagrams drawn for Suncor to explain the different waterhammer scenarios that could take place in their OTSG blowdown line.
Forensic engineer in defense of Spence Valve (who was not responsible for the accident) in law suit resulting from the 2004 BLEVE of a stainless steel tank in a Con Agra Plant in Tennessee. A BLEVE is a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. Although normally associated with accidents involving flammable liquids like propane, a BLEVE can occur in a pressurized hot water tank in which only hot water and steam are released. A BLEVE occurs when superheated water (at elevated temperature and pressure compared to atmospheric conditions) is released through what may start as a relatively small fracture in the vessel. The explosive power comes from the 1600 times expansion of superheated water as a portion of the superheated water flashes to steam at atmospheric pressure. At right is a photo from another accident. It's believed the atmospheric vent on this Laundry condensate receiver became plugged allowing hot condensate from high pressure traps draining to it to pressurize the tank beyond its 5 psig intermittent rating. Upon cracking, probably at a weld, a BLEVE blew off both heads of the vessel. The resulting loss of containment created a shock wave in the surrounding space which knocked down and injured two workers roughly 20 and 50 feet away as well as denting duct work, cracking sheet rock, and breaking a glass window. (Click on BLEVE to view the tank that was utterly destroyed in the Con Agra Incident and for more about what causes a BLEVE)
March 2009, for the Washington D.C. Capital Steam System, analyzed ramifications of improperly sloped new buried steam conduits for potential for destructive fluid-structural interaction due to puddled water filling as much as 25% of the pipe depth. The puddle of water retained in the steam pipe was verified by video survey to be 138 long. Calculated magnitude and location of worst case fluid-structural interaction so engineers could evaluate if conduit should be dug up and reinstalled.
For Duke University, investigated steam release accident which resulted in the death of a maintenance mechanic trying to reactivate a Building PRV Station. Briefed management to explain the series of events that led to the accident. Wrote revised start-up procedures which management perfected and issued. Conducted two day seminar for maintenance, safety staff, and management on water hammer in steam systems including what happened in their accident.
For MIT in Cambridge, MA Nov. 2008, Investigated 200 psi steam release accident where anchors were jerked from their ceiling mounts allowing a slip-type expansion joint to be yanked apart by a condensation-induced waterhammer. Condensate accumulated in the steam line due to an isolated trap which was hidden from plain view by an unrelated equipment modification. The accumulation apparently sat in a piping depression undetected and undisturbed for more than a year because of near equal steam pressure on either side of the University's looped steam network. The accident was finally initiated by a major pressure upset at the University's Power Plant. There were no personnel injuries, but extensive property damage . In addition to reconstructing and explaining the cause of the Accident, provided an 8-hour seminar to steam fitters and University's engineers.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, assisted attorneys in understanding and explaining the cause of a steam explosion which occurred beneath the intersection of 41st and Lexington Ave. Litigation is ongoing. In other work, presented power point explanation of origin of damage resulting from another "loop type" condensation-induced waterhammer incident in New York City. Once again, litigation is ongoing.
For Kent State University, investigated deterioration of underground buried conduit to determine if repeated water hammer events was a possible cause of multiple failures in the HDPE steam conduit system. Found that fluid-structural interaction was unlikely to be the cause of damage and suggested at least one other failure mechanism based on manufacturers installation scheme to allow for expansion.
NASA Langley Research Center, March 2008, inspected layout of new 10" HPS line and reported to NASA engineers and safety personal on design flaws/construction errors and areas of concern with new line. Found that steam traps were under-rated for service, traps stations were needed directly up- and downstream of a critical valve station to preclude a waterhammer incident at this location, and expansion joints (or their guides) which were designed to accept axial stress only would be subjected to lateral stresses that did not appear to be accounted for in design. My 2002 report on a similar investigation for NASA LaRC is accessible below. Taught a two-day 8-hour seminar for NASA engineers, mechanics, and supervisors after presenting my report.
University of Massachusetts Expansion Joint Failure, Amherst, MA. February 2008, Investigated and reported on root cause of externally pressurized expansion joint failure in one of two 20" steam mains from new Central Heating Plant. Found that condensation-induced water hammer had occurred due to misunderstanding of inverted bucket trap operating characteristics by the start-up engineering company. As a consequence, a "parallel two-phase flow instability" between the two nearly-identical 20" lines allowed 7500 gallons of condensate to accumulate in one 20" line unbeknownst to operators. The condensate was able to accumulate without notice because the system was "looped" and under low-flow conditions so that all steam was readily delivered through one line while the other was blocked with condensate. Advised University on identifying other expansion joints which may have sustained damage. Dr. Peter Griffith assisted in this investigation. Clogged trap strainer pictured at right s explained below.
Strainer removed from trap assembly draining the low point in the 2000' of 20" Mains. Clogging material is pipe scale loosed from pipe walls as a result of pipe cleaning by the start-up contractor who, afterward, neglected to clean the strainers. While not the cause of this Accident, the pictures speak to the residual pipe scale present in new pipe and the need for strainers to protect trap orifices. This strainer on the lowest elevation trap drained the most liquid and so caught the most crud.
For Trigen-Boston Energy Corp, the district heating company serving the City of Boston, investigated steam release from expansion joint failure in underground steam conduit due to waterhammer event. In Nov. 2007, at direction of Company Legal Counsel, gave slide presentation to VP/General Manager and engineering staff on root cause of event. Dr. Peter Griffith attended the briefing and advised in this investigation. Gave 8-hour seminar for Trigen engineers and supervisors on understanding waterhammer in steam systems.
Expert Witness for Attorney defending Industrial Campus against OSHA Citation and Fine in case where steam worker was killed during start-up/warmup of a branch steam main. OSHA cited management for violating OSHA's Lock-Out/ Tag-Out Standard CFR 1910.147. My report and affidavit argued that employees' procedures exceeded requirements of OSHA's Lock-Out/ Tag-Out Standard and that the accident was caused by circumstances not included in the Citation or anticipated by the Standard. The Federal Judge upheld this argument among others made by the attorney and dismissed this citation. At right is a photo of the 8" Class 250 cast iron valve which ruptured while being opened to 220 psig steam by the worker. (The valve bypass line has been removed.) My investigation found that the actual root cause of the accident was Shut-down/Start-up Procedures which did not require a drain be opened and LEFT OPEN at the low point in the isolated pipeline. A closed gate valve under full steam pressure leaked steam into the isolated section of line which, over five days, filled the line with condensate. Even though there was a trap in the isolated line section, there was insufficient pressure to discharge condensate from the trap. At start-up, full steam pressure was applied to the water-logged line without noticing the condensate accumulation. When the downstream isolation valve was opened, draining condensate allowed steam to intrude into the subcooled condensate and hammer.
Steam Release Accidents in Chicago, IL Chemical Plant. Three separate failures in the steam system were investigated at the Plant; two were determined to be caused by water hammer, the third by unrestrained pipe expansion after an anchor was removed but not replaced. The sketch below was used to explain the waterhammer incidents. My Report explained that the waterhammer incidents were brought on by allowing condensate to accumulate in the steam system due to the practice of isolating and de-energizing steam mains without opening drains or vents to prevent a vacuum from drawing condensate backward from condensate system. While this common denominator could be considered the ultimate cause of both accidents, there were other proximate causes.
For Suncor Energy in Alberta, Canada, investigated transients in bybass/blow-off line from OTSG boilers which caused large expansion loops to deform enough to damage adjacent electrical cable racks and be dislocated from their pipe supports. On a second trip investigated waterhammer explosion in steam discharge line from Steam Generator. Wrote report explaining three different waterhammer scenarios in 11.000 kPa steam line and recommended corrective action. For Oil Sands site, conducted nineteen 6-hour training classes for workers in Ft. McMurray, Alberta. Investigated and explained transients in the two-phase condensate return line being used to lift condensate to a flash tank at oil sands site. (If you think about it, you can't lift condensate in a two phase condensate-return line without transients).
Coronado North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego, Sep 2004. Comprehensive Report on 8 in.steam valve rupture in a manhole which blew apart releasing 125 psi steam during an attempt to open the valve. The civilian steam worker opening the valve, received second and third degree burns over 20 to 25 % of his body. Had he not been in the process of evacuating the manhole in response to a loud bang which preceded the rupture, it's doubtful he would have survived the incident. Found that the direct cause of the rupture was condensation induced waterhammer resulting from nucleate boiling of ground water in a manhole 300 feet from the accident site. A heat transfer calculation showed that completely submerged steam piping within the downstream manhole (as had been, on occasion, observed to be the case) would generate enough condensate within the pipe to overcome the capacity of the steam trap in the Manhole and fill the 300 feet of 8" pipe between the two manholes. This is a somewhat rare but recurring problem at the base because of the Environmental Protection's office objection to discharging ground and rain water to the street level by sump pumps and the resultant abandonment of sump pump maintenance and replacement.
Concurrent with accident analysis, taught three half-day sessions for civilian steam fitters on condensation-induced water hammer and briefed supervisors and managers on the systemic causes of the accident.
In another phase, inspected 8 Piers at Naval Station San Diego for steam waterhammer potential and reported on hazards found.
For Motorola, now Freescale Semi-Conductor, in Austin, TX, June 2004, investigated cause of steam rupture which shattered a 10" cast iron strainer releasing steam and condensate into the mechanical room of the Plant. Found that one of two 16" steam mains that made up the "loop system" serving the Plant was completely blocked by condensate resulting in an unstable equilibrium in the system. Closing any of several isolation valves between the East and West 16" mains would again accelerate the slug and repeat the accident. Advised Freescale engineers to immediately locked-out valves. Helped them devise a first-of-its-kind method to defuse the situation without down shutting steam production . Taught two-day training class to workers, supervisors, and engineers on condensation- induced water hammer and what caused their accident.
For Houston, TX law firm representing industrial concern, investigated cause of steam accident resulting in operator death when a hydraulic shock stripped the nuts from the studs of a valve flange allowing it to separate releasing a spray of scalding water. The release burned the operator to death.
I concluded that the accident was due to condensate which accumulated atop the valve and subsequent water hammer which was initiated by the operator when he attempted to open the valve. The root cause of the water hammer was not operator error, but the improper original design configuration by the engineer of the trap assembly with respect to the valve.
For NASA Langley Research Center, 2002, investigated anchor failures and seized joints in 4900 ft. long Steam Tunnel No.4 carrying 350 psig steam. Found joint misalignment due to deficient 1964 engineering drawing detail resulting in widespread improper anchor installation by the original contractor. (It should be obvious that the arrangement shown at right cannot work). Problems were not due to water hammer as had been postulated. Analyzed system vulnerability to waterhammer as a precaution. Documented root causes of tunnel problems in Report to NASA Engineers August 2002. Click to view Report.
For BP Refinery and Chemical Plant in Grangemouth, Scotland, investigated two water hammer incidents one of which fractured an 18 in. steam main (at right, pipe peeled open at a Tee) carrying 200 psig steam. Identified cause related to flooding of a culvert thru which a steam main passed. Briefed British Health and Safety Executive occupational safety engineers after delivering reports to BP Engineers. Conducted training session for sixteen BP engineers on water hammer. The article, "The Danger of Flooded Manholes and Submerged Steam Lines" describes one of the two accidents. The Scottish Health and Safety Directorate used my report to produce their Safety Directive on condensation-induced waterhammer.
For Tennessee State Board of Regents, surveyed and analyzed problems in the 6000 ft. underground steam and chilled water utility distribution tunnel at Tennessee State University to determine whether the design engineer or maintenance unit was responsible for chronic problems. The Report identified the root causes of failed anchors, seized expansion joints, blowing valve gaskets, and inoperative traps finding the prime culprits were poor anchor welds and faulty guide installations. Published a "virtual tour" of the tunnel problems with analysis on the Internet for use by all parties involved. Wrote new preventive maintenance schedule, confined space entry program, and detailed start-up procedure for tunnel steam distribution system.
Prepared Permit-Required Confined Space Program for Motlow State Community College to meet OSHA's 29CFR1910.146 regulation. Performed testing of manholes for hazardous levels of H2S, CO, CH4 and O2 and trained operators and administrative staff on use of testing and rescue equipment.
Expert engineering consultant to attorney defending Chubb Insurance Co. against a law suit brought by the victim of a chemical accident at a large paper mill in Houston, Texas. Found that accident was due to improper installation rather than material defect in the rubber expansion joint that failed releasing a spray of caustic 220oF white liquor.
1999, 2000, 2001 Faculty member at University of Wisconsin's annual "Boiler Plant Design Course" speaking on steam accidents. Speaker at Kansas City IDEA Steam Distribution Forum on "Understanding Water Hammer."
Investigated cause of steam accident at Metcalf Lumber in Metcalf, Georgia in which a Class 250 cast iron valve exploded killing a worker as he passed by the valve. My accident report found that the water hammer was due to the lack of rudimentary engineering design for the "in-house installed" addition of an additional drying kiln. he installers didn't understand the impotance of steam traps.
Authored "Reconstruction of the 1988 Steam Accident in Manhole C-4 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska" for the US Department of Justice, Sept. 1997. Expert Witness defending the Army Corps of Engineers in lawsuit involving accident in which a 10" cast iron valve was fractured by steam water hammer severely scalding two asbestos abatement workers. Helped represent the Corps in arbitration by Federal Judge.
Authored "Investigation of Dec. 1996 Steam Accident at the Sacramento Regional Waste Water Treatment Plant" in which a cast iron trap fractured during steam start-up. Developed and trained operators on new safe start-up procedures for the site to prevent future accidents.
Author of investigative report on cause of valve gasket leaks in steam pits at Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton Ohio. Stress analysis showed leaks were caused by inadequate provision for expansion in design, not bad gaskets as was being charged by the owner.
Author and chief investigator retained by the manufacturer for the report on The Expansion Joint Failures at Le Moyne College in Syracuse, NY in which three flexible-hose type joints catastrophically failed during start-up of the steam system. Report found water hammer was not responsible for failure.
Forensic Analyst retained by the Georgia Department of Human Resources to investigate the cause of a steam accident which resulted in an operator's death at Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital. Authored the report: "Analysis of Conditions and Events which led to the Valve Failure in Steam Pit 3A ...". Retained as the expert witness defending the engineering design firm from the law suit which arose from the accident. Report found that the accident was due to a combination of operator error and the inadvertent disabling of a trap during a building demolition which had taken place years earlier. The magazine article "What Caused the Steam Accident that killed Jack Smith" which appeared in the July 1995 issue of Heating/Piping/Air Conditioning magazine and the Feb. '96 issue of National Engineer was based on this accident.
Engineer for design of new $1.5 million dollar Central Steam Plant for the campus of Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital.
Technical reviewer adjudging validity of energy conservation measures submitted in Technical Analysis Reports (TA's) to the State of Florida's Energy Office to compete for grants through the Department of Energy's Schools & Hospitals Grant Program. Authored State's Life Cycle Costing methodology to be required in all reports submitted in 1995. Conducted training session for approximately 120 professional engineers seeking certification to write TA Reports in Florida in 1995. Conducted subsequent training session on Life Cycle Costing at DOE Region IV Conference for State Energy Directors from Southeastern States.
Authored 1992 Technical Analysis Report of energy conservation measures for Patterson Hospital in Randolph County, Georgia. Wrote engineering study --Deficiencies in Design and Operation of Chilled Water Plant which analyzed and offered solutions to inadequate CHW distribution in the hospital. In 1993, designed, bid, and oversaw construction of redesigned central chilled water plant for the hospital. Similarly, completed comprehensive lighting retrofit project for the hospital and nursing home. Completed projects reduced Hospital's electric utility bill by 35%. Projects were awarded a $114,000 matching grant through the D.O.E.
Re-designed and supervised replacement of steam traps and attendant condensate piping including removal of asbestos in steam pits on the campus of the 15 building Fulton-Dekalb Hospital Complex, 1985.
Project Engineer and Project Manager for 1985 design of $500,000 Waste-to-Energy Incineration Plant and waste heat boiler at 915 bed Grady Memorial Hospital. Authored $385,000 grant request for this project received from D.O.E..
Investigated underground leaks from hot water piping systems serving six of eight buildings which received new HVAC systems at Brook Run Mental Health Facility. Identified manufacturing defect in pipe joints.
In association with JND Sterling, co-authored feasibility study of energy conservation measures in prototypical existing NASA Office Building at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. This study added a fourth volume to the three volume set previously accomplished for NASA. Project Director and primary author for the $144,000 Energy Conservation Analysis of Existing Buildings and the two volume set: New Building Energy Design Guidelines for the NASA Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.
Project Manager for evaluation of all Mechanical, Electrical, Plumbing, and Fire Protection Systems in the 42 story First Atlanta Bank Tower and 8 story Bank Annex.
Project Manager and co-author for $200,000 energy study conducted in five largest mental hospitals and institutions operated by the State of Georgia. Five million dollars worth of energy saving measures were identified of which about $1 million worth were selected for implementation. Head mechanical engineer on design of two largest projects:
For the Georgia Forestry Commission, co-authored "Wood Energy Feasibility Study for Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital" to replace fossil fuel steam boilers with wood fired boiler. This report was submitted to the Department of Energy through the State Office of Energy Resources and received a 50% matching grant to fund the $1/4 million project.
Retained by the International Engineering Support Group of Coca Cola to advise on the feasibility of a programmed $5 million cogeneration plant for their Heightstown, New Jersey plant. Based largely a re-evaluation and correction of a computer study performed by the recommending consulting engineer on the project, the project was canceled after Mr. Kirsner demonstrated that the project had a negative net cash flow.
At NASA Johnson Space Center, analyzed impending purchase of two 2,000 ton steam turbine driven chillers designed by NASA's consulting engineers. Recommended alternative chiller selection based on predicted first cost savings of $300,000 and annual savings of $230,000 per year. NASA accepted recommendation, canceled procurement action, and re-designed the Chiller Plant addition based on Mr. Kirsner's recommendation.
July 2009, Expert for Spence Engineering (who was not responsible for this Accident) in law suit arrising from the BLEVE of the stainless steel tank shown at right. For a hot water BLEVE to occur: (1) the tank must be pressurized so water can be superheated with respect to atmospheric pressure, (2) there must be steam atop the water in the vessel, and (3) the vessel must suffer a steam release through a crack, hole, or perhaps a safety valve relieving. Thus, the tank must generally be pressurized beyond it's rating, or in a weakened condition.
The water inside this 304 SS tank non-ASME which was supposed to operate at no greater than 15 psig (but was tested to 100 psi by the manufacturer) was inadvertently overheated to a temperature approaching 288oF by uncontrolled application of 41 psig steam to water passing through a heat exchanger. (An inoperative control convinced us the temperature limiting control on the heat exchanger must have been bypassed). A small water leak at a pump seal allowed water to leak out of the closed system without being made-up by the tank's water regulating valve. That's because the pressure in the tank exceeded the pressure setting of the regulator. Thus steam filled the void left by the leaking water.
Stress Corrosion Cracking concealed by insulation severely weakened the tank so it could not withstand the pressure of the hot water. We believe a crack developed near the top of the tank which released steam so that a rapid pressure drop initiated the the BLEVE which proceeded to blow the tank apart causing an instantaneous total loss of containment. The superheated water in the tank, upon release, partially flashed to steam immediately releasing expanding vapor which created a shock wave in the air of the surrounding space. A nearby worker was knocked to the floor and badly scalded by the hot water entrained in the steam blasted from the tank. A 75 psig safety relief valve provided atop the tank never actuated.
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